作者简介 罗伯特·阿克塞尔罗德：密歇根大学政治学与公共政策教授，美国科学院院士，著名的行为分析及博弈专家，主要由于他在博弈论和复杂性理论上的基础性突破而广为人知。阿克塞尔罗德是把计算机模型运用到社会科学问题领域的权威学者。作者受到过来自美国科学促进会、美国政治科学协会、麦克阿瑟基金会以及美国国家科学院的奖励。除本书外，还著有《合作的进化》等著作。

Robert Axelrod is widely known for his groundbreaking work in game theory and complexity theory. He is a leader in applying computer modeling to social science problems. His book The Evolution of Cooperation has been hailed as a seminal contribution and has been translated into eight languages since its initial publication. The Complexity of Cooperation is a sequel to that ...(展开全部)

作者简介 罗伯特·阿克塞尔罗德：密歇根大学政治学与公共政策教授，美国科学院院士，著名的行为分析及博弈专家，主要由于他在博弈论和复杂性理论上的基础性突破而广为人知。阿克塞尔罗德是把计算机模型运用到社会科学问题领域的权威学者。作者受到过来自美国科学促进会、美国政治科学协会、麦克阿瑟基金会以及美国国家科学院的奖励。除本书外，还著有《合作的进化》等著作。

Robert Axelrod is widely known for his groundbreaking work in game theory and complexity theory. He is a leader in applying computer modeling to social science problems. His book The Evolution of Cooperation has been hailed as a seminal contribution and has been translated into eight languages since its initial publication. The Complexity of Cooperation is a sequel to that ...(展开全部)

Within the realist school of international relations, a prevailing view holds that the anarchic structure of the international system invariably forces the great powers to seek security at one another's expense, dooming even peaceful nations to an unrelenting struggle for power and dominance. Rational Theory of International Politics offers a more nuanced alternative to this vi...(展开全部)

Within the realist school of international relations, a prevailing view holds that the anarchic structure of the international system invariably forces the great powers to seek security at one another's expense, dooming even peaceful nations to an unrelenting struggle for power and dominance. Rational Theory of International Politics offers a more nuanced alternative to this vi...(展开全部)

The much-discussed book that explores how cooperation can emerge in a world of self-seeking egoists--whether superpowers, businesses, or individuals--when there is no central authority to police their actions.

In The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare, Robert Sugden sets out to answer a question that lies at the heart of economics and politics: how can individuals coordinate their behaviour in the absence of central law-enforcing agencies? Using the tools of evolutionary game theory, Sugden shows how self-enforcing conventions of property and reciprocity can evolve sponta...(展开全部)

作者簡介 強納森．坦伯Jonathan Tepper 倫敦總體經濟研究機構Variant Perception的創辦人，該機構的服務對象為避險基金和高資產客戶，坦伯曾任美國銀行（Bank of America）自營交易部門副總裁。 坦伯在北卡羅來納大學教堂山分校（University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill）分別以最優異及優異成績取得歷史系和經濟系學士學位。他在牛津大學（Oxford University）取得當代史碩士學位，且為羅德獎學金得主（Rhodes Scholar）。 坦伯是《Endgame終結大債時代》與《Code Red紅色警戒：危機下的財富生存之道》兩書的共同作者。 丹妮絲．赫恩Denise Hearn Variant Perception公司業務發展部主管。她擁有貝勒大學（Baylor Un...(展开全部)

If, as Darwin suggests, evolution relentlessly encourages the survival of the fittest, why are humans compelled to live in cooperative, complex societies? In this fascinating examination of the roots of human trust and virtue, a zoologist and former American editor of the Economist reveals the results of recent studies that suggest that self-interest and mutual aid are not at...(展开全部)